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Note
RISKY BUSINESS: HTAs, THE CASH FORWARD EXCLUSION
AND TOP OF IOWA COOPERATIVE v. SCHEWE
"Buy low, sell high. Fear-that's the other guy's problem. '
I. INTRODUCTION
Disaster hit America's farm belt in 1995-96, affecting millions of tons
of grain, bringing financial ruin to many and tearing apart the economic
and social fabric of small communities across the Midwest.2 This catastro-
phe caused losses totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.3 Ironically, this
tragedy resulted not from crop failures, infestations or natural disasters,
but from unprecedented movements in the grain markets that saw the
price of corn more than double during that time. 4
The reason this price rise wrought such financial havoc was the wide-
spread use of "Flex-Hedge-To-Arrive" contracts (HTAs) between farmers
and grain elevators ("elevators"), ostensibly used to protect against the risk
of price drops before the parties could deliver their crops to market.
5
1. TRADING PLACES (Paramount 1983).
2. See Tom Seery, Heartache in Buffalo Center: Risky Grain Trading Tears Iowa
Town Apart, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 27, 1996, at C2 (describing effects of
hedge-to-arrive (HTA) contracts on small community).
3. See George Gunset, CFTC Acts on Grain Hedging Contracts: Farmers Facing
Losses Look to Government for Help, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 30, 1996, at 1 (noting one
individual case affecting 15 million tons of grain); David Hendee, Hedge Contracts
Sour the Harvest for Some Farmers Avoiding a Repeat, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 15,
1996, at 1A, available in 1996 WL 6031027 (estimating losses over $500 million);
James Walsh, Hurt by the Hedge: Sustained High Grain Prices Are Costly for Farmers, Co-
op., MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., Aug. 18, 1996, at ID, available in 1996 WL
6925381 (estimating losses could reach $500 million).
4. See In re Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Minn. 1997)
(describing rise in corn prices beginning in October 1994); Hendee, supra note 3,
at 1A (stating per bushel corn price rose from approximately two dollars to over
five dollars).
5. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1270 (describing combined effects of
"unprecedented" price rise and contract terms as factors leading to elevator's fi-
nancial difficulties); Nicholas P. Iavarone, Understanding the Hedge-To-Arrive Contro-
versy, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 371, 390-93, 400 (1997) (describing potentially
disastrous results from using HTA contracts during 1995-96 crop years and assert-
ing that purpose of HTAs is supposedly to provide price protection); Eric Asklesen,
Note, Hedge-To-Arrive Contracts and the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 KAN J.L & PUB.
POL'Y 122, 123, 125 (1998) (noting HTAs are used to protect against dropping
prices and asserting record-setting prices in 1996 led to financial problems for par-
ties engaged in HTA contracts); Matthew J. Cole, Note, Hedge-To-Arrive Contracts:
(125)
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Grain producers have long relied on "cash forward" contracts to guarantee
a fixed price for crops that are to be delivered at a later date.6 HTA con-
tracts are more flexible variants of cash forward contracts. 7 Cash forward
contracts are designed to protect farmers from adverse price changes and
to secure grain dealers a source of supply.8 HTAs are intended to provide
similar protections and also enable grain producers to take advantage of
short-term fluctuations in the market.9 This greater degree of flexibility
also introduces more opportunities for speculation and accordingly leads
to an equivalently increased level of financial exposure. 10 The risks inher-
ent in HTAs made farmers and elevators particularly vulnerable to the ris-
ing prices from 1995 to 1996.11
The Second Chapter of the Farm Crisis, 1 DRAKE J. Aomc. L. 243, 249 (1996) (stating
HTAs originated in response to predictably lower grain market at harvest and re-
sulting demand for contract capable of stabilizing revenue). HTA contracts come
in a wide variety. See Barz v. Geneva Elevator Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D.
Iowa 1998) (asserting HTAs are widely varied in terms of language and parties'
circumstances); Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (acknowledging terms of HTAs differ in each case); Asklesen, supra, at 125
(briefly describing variety of HTA contracts). For purposes of simplicity, this Note
will use the term "HTA" to refer to more speculative and complex variations (in-
cluding Flex-HTAs) and will distinguish simple versions when necessary.
6. See ROBERT W. KOLB, UNDERSTANDING FUTURES MARKETS 2-3 (1987) (defin-
ing forward contract and noting theories on origins);JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HIS-
TORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 3 (1987) (describing
use of to arrive or forward contracts to protect against seasonal price drops in
grain markets); lavarone, supra note 5, at 372 (describing purposes and traditional
methods of "hedging" in forward contracts). Forward contracts are typically de-
fined as "a cash sale of physical commodities for deferred shipment or delivery."
Asklesen, supra note 5, at 123.
7. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1269 (characterizing HTAs as variant
of "fixed-price contract for deferred delivery" with flexible pricing and delivery
terms); Iavarone, supra note 5, at 373-74 (describing simple HTA contract); Cole,
supra note 5, at 248 (describing HTA contracts as variations on forward pricing
contracts).
8. See MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 3 (describing functions of to arrive con-
tracts); lavarone, supra note 5, at 372-73 (describing purposes and traditional
methods of hedging); Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A
Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FoRDHAM L. REv. 191, 194 (1988) (asserting that
"[florward contracts enabled farmers to secure a specific price while allowing dis-
tributors and processors to obtain a guaranteed supply of the commodity").
9. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1269 (discussing features of HTAs);
Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Smith, No. 5-97-21, 1997 WL 762813, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 8, 1997) (describing benefits of HTAs in providing greater flexibility
and enabling farmers to protect against usual downturn in prices at harvest time).
10. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp at 1270 (asserting parties' course of
performance under HTAs created financial problems for Grain Land); Coun-
trymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *3 (asserting greater flexibility of flex-HTAs also leads
to greater risk).
11. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 126 (stating price rises in corn market led to
increased financial risk for elevators engaged in HTAs that permitted rolling
scheduled deliveries to new reference month).
[Vol. 44: p. 125
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The economic and legal consequences of the 1995-96 price rise are
still unresolved. 12 Parties seeking to avoid their obligations under HTAs
have argued a number of theories ranging from RICO and federal securi-
ties violations, to common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and negli-
gent misrepresentation. 13 The most contentious issue, however, is
whether HTAs are valid cash forward contracts or "futures" contracts that
can be traded only on exchanges subject to Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") regulation. 14 In a series of opinions issued during
the spring and summer of 1998, Judge Bennett of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Iowa addressed this issue and ruled
that the individual HTAs involved were valid "cash forward" contracts that
were beyond the regulatory reach of the CFTC.
1 5
This Note discusses the Northern District of Iowa's ruling in Top of
Iowa Cooperative v. Schewe16 in light of other decisions regarding the regula-
tion of contracts for future delivery of commodities. 17 Part II analyzes and
compares cash forward contracts, futures contracts and HTAs in terms of
how each functions and the purposes each serves. 18 Part II also summa-
rizes the history and goals of commodity regulation and the manner in
which courts have treated the "cash forward exclusion" of the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA).' 9 Part III discusses the relevant facts of Top of
Iowa.20 Part IV traces the district court's approach in determining if the
12. See Anne Fitzgerald, Disputes Linger Over Hedge-To-Arrive Grain Contracts,
DES MOINES REG., Apr. 19, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 3203515 (describing
ongoing conflicts prompted by corn price increase).
13. See Barz v. Geneva Elevator Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 943, 957-59 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (alleging negligent misrepresentation); Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F.
Supp. 2d 843, 850 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (alleging securities violations); Oeltjenbrun v.
CSA Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1052-53 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (alleging breach
of fiduciary duty); Eby v. Producers Co-op., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 428, 430 (W.D. Mich.
1997) (alleging RICO violations); Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1279 (alleging
common law fraud, material misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation).
14. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (describing issue as "the key question
in almost all of the cases involving HTAs"); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1027
(descibing issue of whether HTAs are cash forward or futures contracts as "highly
contentious" and "fundamental").
15. SeeJohnson v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1001 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (concluding HTAs in question were valid cash forward contracts); Barz, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 957 (same); Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 1041-42, 1044, 1047 (same).
16. 6 F. Supp. 2d 843 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
17. For a discussion of the facts of the case and an analysis of the court's
reasoning, see infra notes 106-87 and accompanying text. For a discussion of sig-
nificant cases addressing the distinction between futures and cash forward con-
tracts, see infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the types of contracts at issue, see infra notes 23-78 and
accompanying text.
19. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994 & Supp. 1995). For a further discussion of the
major cases addressing the cash forward exclusion, see infra notes 79-105 and ac-
companying text.
20. For a discussion of the facts of Top of Iowa, see infra notes 106-16 and
accompanying text.
1999] NOTE
3
Reid: Risky Business: HTAs, the Cash Forward Exclusion and Top of Iowa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
HTAs in question were valid cash forward contracts and also analyzes the
conclusions of law of the district court's decision.2 1 Last, Part V discusses
the likely impact of the district court's decision regarding the validity of
HTAs and how problems related to HTAs might be addressed in the
future.22
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cash Forward Contracts, Futures and the "Cash Forward Exclusion"
of the Commodity Exchange Act
In a cash forward contract, the commodity purchaser pays a fixed
price for a certain quantity of the commodity to be delivered at a set time
in the future.2 3 Both parties contemplate actual delivery, and ultimate
delivery is an obligation of the seller under the contract.2 4 This arrange-
ment enables a farmer to secure a price for crops long before they are
harvested, or even planted, and provides the buyer with a reasonably guar-
anteed source of supply to be delivered at a specific time. 25 Although
21. For a discussion and analysis of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 117-
87 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the outlook for the future of HTAs and the possibility
of their regulation, see infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text.
23. See Cole, supra note 5, at 247 ("A forward contract is a cash sale of physical
commodities for deferred shipment or delivery.").
24. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67
F.3d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating parties to cash forward contracts contem-
plate and intend future delivery of actual commodity); Salomon Forex, Inc. v.
Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (asserting actual physical delivery of com-
modity is anticipated in cash forward contracts); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating
that "a cash forward contract is one in which the parties contemplate physical
transfer of the actual commodity"); In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,778 (CFTC Dec. 6,1979) (stating major
distinguishing feature of cash forward contracts is legal obligation to deliver and
generally fulfill expectation of delivery).
25. See MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 3 (describing development of to arrive con-
tracts in response to various price and delivery-related problems in nineteenth cen-
tury American grain markets). American grain markets suffered significant
seasonal price variations due mainly to fluctuating supply. See id. Prices dropped
dramatically as farmers flooded the market after the fall harvest. See id. Prices
dropped so low that the cost of delivering crops to market became prohibitive. See
id. As a result, much of the harvest would never be delivered and was wasted. See
id. This led to shortages later in the year and associated dramatic price increases.
See id. This cycle of supply and price shocks led buyers and sellers to seek means of
securing prices and supplies in advance of actual delivery. See id. To arrive con-
tracts provided a solution in which the parties agreed on the sale of a specific
quantity and grade of grain at a set price to be delivered on a specific date in the
future. See id.
William L. Stein provided a similar analysis in The Exchange-Trading Requirement
of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 VAND. L. REv. 473, 474-75 (1988). Stein, however,
added the gloss that construction of storage helped alleviate the supply fluctua-
tions, but did not solve the problems completely. See id. at 475. Forward contracts
then developed in response to the problems of supply fluctuations, limited storage
[Vol. 44: p. 125
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both sides still retain some price and production risks, these risks are
greatly reduced.
2 6
In contrast, parties to futures contracts are able to nullify their con-
tractual obligations by executing offsetting transactions. 27 Thus, a holder
space and poor transportation. See id. When large dealers had insufficient supply
to satisfy their commitments, they would enter forward contracts with grain produ-
cers. See id. The deferral of the delivery date resulted from the time delay in
bringing the crops from the farm to the dealer. See id. Before long, parties recog-
nized other significant benefits of forward contracts. See id. (asserting "sellers rec-
ognized... [their] utility... as a method of allowing for transportation time...
[and] as a general method of merchandising" their crops). In addition, brokers
could secure a source of supply without having to invest capital in storage facilities.
See id. Ultimately, forward contracts led to greater efficiency in the markets, en-
abling "farmers to sell grain they expected to harvest and brokers to sell inven-
tories they expected to acquire." Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 130 (1974) ("A
cash forward contract enables the buyer and the seller of commodities to properly
plan for and utilize both storage and production facilities and to make commit-
ments for deferred deliveries of the commodity or of further-processed
products.").
Considering that grain farming and its inherent risks are as old as recorded
history, it is not surprising that other observers trace the history of forward con-
tracting as far back as ancient times. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 2-3 (asserting some
authors trace history of forward contracting back to ancient Rome, classical Greece
or even ancient India); MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 3 (citing various theories that
date origins of futures trading back to Greco-Roman times or even as far as 2000
B.C., but noting that modern predecessor is to arrive contract developed in eight-
eenth century Europe).
26. See lavarone, supra note 5, at 372-73 (explaining cash forward contracts do
not eliminate all risk involved). For example, if a farmer enters a cash forward
contract with an elevator to deliver 50,000 bushels of corn on December 1 at $2.50
per bushel, the transaction reduces the farmer's price risk while increasing the
production risk. See id. at 372. The farmer need not worry about the price drop-
ping below $2.50 per bushel, but the farmer will be liable to the elevator for
breach of contract upon failure to deliver the full 50,000 bushels. See id. at 372-73.
In addition to the lost income from the shortage, the farmer is likely to be liable
for any special damages suffered by the elevator. See id. at 372.
For its part, the elevator assumes some of the farmer's price risk. See id. at 373.
In this example, the elevator stands to lose if the market price drops significantly
below the contract price. See id.. Not only will the elevator be forced to acquire
the grain at a higher price than it could have without the contract, but it will either
have to sell it at a loss or incur storage costs in the hopes of being able to hold it
until the price rises again. See id..
In a sense, the parties reduce their risks by trading them. See Solomon &
Dicker, supra note 8, at 194 (stating forward contracts transferred price risk from
grain producer to buyer). The farmer is willing to take on production risk in the
form of a contractual obligation to deliver in return for a guaranteed price. See id.
(noting farmers guaranteed delivery under forward contracts, but benefitted from
securing specific price for crops). On the other hand, the elevator is better able to
deal with falling prices than with uncertain supply, so it is willing to take on some
price risk in return for the farmer's guaranty of delivery. See id. (noting grain
buyers developed means of transferring price risk to speculators).
27. See Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 772 (asserting party to futures contract can
avoid delivery obligation by entering offsetting transaction); Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d
at 971 (stating futures transactions seldom result in delivery because offsetting
transactions extinguish obligation); Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156-57
(8th Cir. 1971) (indicating that futures trader has choice between fulfilling deliv-
5
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of a "short" position who has received payment for and is obligated to
deliver a specific quantity of the commodity on a specific date can offset
the obligation by taking a "long" position for the same quantity of the
commodity.28 Any interim price change in the futures contract will repre-
sent profit or loss on the transaction. 2 9 Offsetting transactions are made
possible by standardization of futures contracts and highly liquid mar-
kets.3 0 These factors free futures traders from some of the practical con-
ery obligation or offsetting and that 99% of futures transactions on Chicago Board
of Trade are offset); Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 23,777 (asserting that "most parties to commodity futures contracts ex-
tinguish their legal obligation to make or take delivery by offsetting their con-
tracts"); H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 130 (stating standardization of futures contracts
meant parties could liquidate delivery obligation through offset); David J. Gilberg,
Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Commodities
Laws, 39 VANO. L. REv. 1599, 1603 (1986) (asserting parties to futures contracts can
extinguish delivery obligation through offset); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at
197 (same); Mark D. Young & William L. Stein, Swap Transactions Under the Com-
modity Exchange Act: Is Congressional Action Needed?, 76 GEO. L.J. 1917, 1923-24
(1988) (same).
28. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156-57 (describing typical futures transaction). A
person who buys a commodity or has the right and obligation to take delivery of a
commodity under a futures contract has what is called a "long" position. See id.
(describing futures transactions); LEwIs H. BISBEE &JOHN C. SIMONDS, THE BOARD
OF TRADE AND THE PRODUCE EXCHANGE-THEIR HISTORY, METHODS AND LAw 50
(1884) (defining long position); KOLB, supra note 6, at 2 (same); MARKHAM, supra
note 6, at 203 (same). A person who sells a commodity or has the right and obliga-
tion to deliver the commodity under a futures contract, without actually possessing
any of the commodity, has a "short" position. See Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1157 (defin-
ing "short" position); BISBEE & SIMONDS, supra, at 50 (same); KOLB, supra note 6, at
2 (same); MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 203 (same).
29. See Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 579-80 (describing settlement of futures contracts
through offsetting transaction); KOLB, supra note 6, at 15-16 (same). Consider the
following example: On June 1, trader A goes short one December corn contract at
$2.50 per bushel. In other words, A sells one contract to deliver 5000 bushels of
corn in December and receives $12,500 in return. See id. at 2 (describing short
position). Because A is merely a futures trader and has no ability to produce or
deliver the grain, A must offset the transaction to nullify the delivery obligation.
See id. at 15 (describing offset). A does this by going long one December corn
contract. See id. The December contract's equal and opposite obligation cancels
out the delivery obligation of the short position. See id. at 15-17. If, in the interim,
the price of corn for December delivery has dropped to $2.00, for instance, A's
profit is $2500 ($12,500 received for the short position less $10,000 paid for the
long position). See id. at 16. If the price has risen to $3.00, however, A's loss is
$2500 ($12,500 received for the short position less $15,000 paid for the long posi-
tion). See id.
30. See Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 579-80 (stating that "[t] he fungible nature of...
[futures] contracts facilitates offsetting transactions"); H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 130
(stating development of interchangeability made offsetting transactions possible);
MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 205 (stating standardization makes offsetting transac-
tions possible, as trader wishing to offset long position can find trader who wishes
to offset matching short position through clearinghouse); Committee on Com-
modities Regulation of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Forward Contract
Exclusion: An Analysis of Off-Exchange Commodity-Based Instruments, 41 Bus. LAw. 853,
874 (1986) [hereinafter Forward Contract Exclusion] (stating fungibility of standard-
ized contracts makes offsetting transactions possible).
[Vol. 44: p. 125
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straints that prevent parties to cash forward contracts from avoiding their
obligations. 31 The offsetting transaction is also what makes futures con-
tracts speculative instruments as opposed to purely marketing
instruments.
32
Courts and other observers have long recognized the important dis-
tinction between the use of contracts to protect against price changes and
the use of contracts purely to speculate on price changes. 33 In Congress'
efforts to curb speculation in the commodities markets, it has consistently
exempted cash forward transactions from regulation.3 4 Today, "contracts
31. See MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 203 (asserting cash forward contracts are
"personalized," thus limiting their ability to be traded in secondary markets);
Young & Stein, supra note 27, at 1924 (stating forward contracts, in contrast to
futures contracts, are not fungible and are rarely offset).
32. See Gilberg, supra note 27, at 1603 (asserting primary purpose in trading
futures is hedging price risks or speculating on price changes rather than purchas-
ing or selling actual commodities); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199
(describing principal participants in futures markets as hedgers, speculators and
market makers). The primary difference between speculation and hedging is
based on risk assumption. See id. at 199-200 (contrasting hedgers with specula-
tors). Hedgers generally enter contracts to reduce risk associated with producing,
buying and selling the underlying commodities. See Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 249 (1905) (defining hedging); KOLB, supra note
6, at 6 (describing hedgers); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199 (same).
Speculators, by contrast, intentionally expose themselves to risk with the hope
of profiting from price movements. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 147 (defining specu-
lator as "a trader who enters the futures market in pursuit of profit, thereby ac-
cepting an increase in risk"); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199-200
(describing speculators). Speculators have little or no involvement in trading the
actual commodity. See id. at 200 (describing speculators); Young & Stein, supra
note 27, at 1920 (same). Futures contracts developed as a means of transferring
exposure from risk-averse hedgers to those more willing to speculate. See Salomon
Forex, 8 F.3d at 971 ("The main purpose realized by entering into futures transac-
tions is to transfer price risks from suppliers, processors and distributors (hedgers)
to. those more willing to take the risk (speculators)."); Stein, supra note 25, at 476
(discussing origins of futures contracts). The ability to enter offsetting transac-
tions makes futures contracts attractive to speculators because it enables them to
seek price-based profit opportunities without having to accept or make delivery of
the underlying commodities. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, at 130 (noting offset capa-
bility led to increased use of futures contracts by speculators).
33. See Board of Trade, 198 U.S. at 249 (asserting contracts intended as hedges,
even when settled other than by delivery, "stand on different ground from
purchases made merely with the expectation that they will be satisfied by set-off');
Embrey v.Jemison, 131 U.S. 336, 344 (1889) (asserting contract for future delivery
of goods is valid if actual delivery is intended, but "[i]f, under the guise of such
contract, the real intent be merely to speculate in the rise or fall of prices ... the
whole transaction constitutes nothing more than a wager"); BISBEE & SIMONDS,
supra note 28, at 287 (emphasizing distinction between gambling and legitimate
speculation that is normal mercantile activity associated with commodity trading);
Stein, supra note 25, at 477 (noting negative popular perception of speculators in
early twentieth century at same time that Congress recognized legitimate, essential
risk-shifting role of futures contracts in grain marketing).
34. See Glenn Willett Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Com-
modity for Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1185
(1978) (tracing history of cash forward exclusion); Forward Contract Exclusion, supra
1999] NOTE
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note 30, at 856-59 (same); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 129 (describing cash forward
exclusion as feature of various laws regulating futures markets).
Congressional attempts to regulate futures trading date back to the 1840s. See
Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 856 (discussing history of futures regu-
lation). State attempts date back to the 1860s. See id. In the nineteenth century,
futures markets were plagued by rampant, often disastrous speculation. See MARK-
HAm, supra note 6, at 5-7 (describing notorious attempts to corner markets that led
to collapses in wheat and gold markets). Price volatility in agricultural markets,
which farmers blamed on the Chicago Board of Trade, led to increased congres-
sional efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to rein in futures
trading. See id. at 10 (discussing pressure on Congress from populist movement
and Grangers to regulate futures trading and noting 200 such bills were intro-
duced between 1880 and 1920).
The predecessor of modem futures regulation was the Cotton Futures Act of
1917, ch. 313, 39 Stat. 476 (1916). See Clark, supra, at 1183 (discussing early fu-
tures legislation). The Cotton Futures Act taxed contracts "of sale of any cotton
for future delivery." Ch. 313, § 3, 39 Stat. 476. The Act made no distinction be-
tween cash forward and futures contracts. See Clark, supra, at 1183 (discussing Cot-
ton Futures Act).
In 1921, Congress passed the Future Trading Act (FTA). Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187
(1921). Congress' intent was to prevent price manipulation and what many per-
ceived as excessive speculation in grains. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 970 (citing
Stein, supra note 25, at 477 & n.23); In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,779-80 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979) (discussing
legislative purposes of FTA). The FTA placed a tax on the sale of grain for future
delivery. See Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 857 (discussing FTA). The
FTA excluded from the term "future delivery" "any sale of cash grain for deferred
shipment or delivery." Ch. 86, § 2, 42 Stat. 187. The purpose of this exception
(the cash forward exclusion) was to exempt legitimate forward transactions from
the tax. See Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 857 (discussing purpose of
cash forward exclusion). Only one year after its inception, however, the Supreme
Court struck down the FTA as an improper exercise of the taxing power. See Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 (1922) (finding "no ground upon which the provisions we
have been considering can be sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing power").
Congress responded by passing the Grain Futures Act of 1922 (GFA), Pub. L.
No. 67-331, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998. See SalomonForex, 8 F.3d at 970 (discussing GFA);
Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 857 (same); Stein, supra note 25, at 478
(same). The GFA served the same purposes as the FTA, but relied on Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 970 (compar-
ing GFA to FTA); Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 857 (same); Stein,
supra note 25, at 478 (same). The GFA prohibited "contract[s] of sale of grain for
future delivery" except those executed on designated exchanges. Ch. 369, § 4, 42
Stat. 998, 999. This is commonly known as the "exchange trading requirement."
See Stein, supra note 25, at 479 (discussing exchange trading requirement). The
GFA retained the cash forward exclusion, permitting off-exchange contracts for
the "sale of cash grain for deferred shipment or delivery." Ch. 369, § 2, 42 Stat.
998; see Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 857 (stating GFA retained cash
forward exclusion of FTA).
Collapses in the futures markets in the early 1930s created a perception that
the GFA was too weak to serve its intended purposes. See id. at 858 (discussing
history of GFA). In response, Congress amended the GFA in 1936, renaming it the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and extending the scope of federal regulation
from grain to commodities in general. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No.
74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936); Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at
858 (discussing CEA). Again, the CEA retained the cash forward exclusion. See
Ch. 545, § 2, 49 Stat. 1491; Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 858 (discuss-
ing aspects of CEA). The latest major congressional action in regulating commodi-
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of a sale of a commodity for future delivery" are subject to CFTC oversight
under the CEA.35 Under the CEA, it is illegal to sell such contracts except
on CFTC designated exchanges. 36 The CEA, however, specifically ex-
cludes any "sale of cash Commodity for deferred shipment or delivery"
from the term "future delivery."3 7 The language is subtle, and the differ-
ence is often difficult to apply in any given case. 38 To make matters worse,
the CEA does not provide legal definitions to distinguish between the
terms.39 As a result, courts have developed an operational distinction be-
tween the terms, focusing primarily on a fact-specific examination of
whether the parties to a particular contract intended actual delivery of the
commodity.
40
Much of the legal debate about HTAs focuses on whether they are
cash forward contracts or futures contracts. 4 1 Not surprisingly, judicial as-
ties was the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in
1974, in which Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction over contracts for future
delivery of commodities. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974); Forward Contract Exclusion, supra note 30, at 859
(discussing creation of CFTC and noting cash forward exclusion has been
retained).
35. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (grant-
ing CFTC jurisdiction over futures contracts).
36. See id. § 6(a).
37. Id. § la(1l).
38. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 971 (describing difference as "semantically sub-
tle"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680
F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing statute as "ambiguous on its face").
39. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 971 (stating "futures contract" and "future" are
not statutorily defined terms); Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 577 (stating "future delivery"
and "cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery" are not defined); Oeltjen-
brun v. CSA Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1033-34 (N.D. Iowa 1998)
("'[F]utures contracts' and 'cash forward contracts' are terms of art which do not
appear in the [CEA]." (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Noble
Metals Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 772 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995))); In re Grain Land Coop.,
978 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (D. Minn. 1997) (stating terms are not defined); Gilberg,
supra note 27, at 1605 (stating neither CEA nor CFTC regulations define terms).
40. See Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 772 (stating "exclusion is predicated on both
parties contemplating and intending future delivery"); In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309,
313 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating "the concept of delivery is the determining factor");
Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 ("[W] hether a contract contemplates actual de-
livery has been a recurring theme in judicial determinations of whether or not a
contract memorializes a cash forward transaction."); In re Stovall, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,778 (CFTC Dec. 6,
1979) (noting major difference between cash forward contracts and futures con-
tracts is not only legal obligation to perform, but also "generally fulfilled expecta-
tion that the contract will lead to the exchange of commodities for money");
Gilberg, supra note 27, at 1605 (noting definition of terms has been left to CFTC
and judicial interpretation, which has focused primarily on commercial nature of
cash forward contracts and delivery obligation).
41. SeeJohnson v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 985, 988 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (stating issue of whether HTAs are cash forward or futures contracts is key
issue in many cases); Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 856 (N.D.
Iowa 1998) (addressing question of whether HTAs are cash forward or futures con-
tracts); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1027 (same); see also Asklesen, supra note 5, at
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sessment of the issue examines the parties' intent to deliver as evidence of
whether they are truly a means of transferring title or are merely specula-
tive devices. 42 This determination is complicated because HTAs exhibit
qualities of both cash forward and futures contracts. 43
B. HTAs and How They Work
Simple HTAs originated in the 1980s.44 HTAs began as simple vari-
ants of cash forward contracts, but soon began to acquire more and more
characteristics of futures contracts. 45 This process has progressed to the
point that it is now possible to argue that newer versions of HTAs are more
like speculative futures contracts than cash forward contracts. 4 6 Consider
the following examples of simple HTAs and newer, more complex HTAs.
In a simple HTA, the buyer and seller base the eventual purchase
price of the commodity on the futures contract price of the commodity for
the same month that the seller anticipates actual delivery.47 The eventual
purchase price will be the futures contract price (set at the time the HTA
is written) minus a "basis" equal to the difference between the futures con-
tract price on the exchange and the local cash price for the commodity.
48
The basis tends to decrease, or "narrow," as the delivery date ap-
129 (stating that "question surrounding hedge-to-arrive contracts is whether they
are future contracts . . . or whether ... [they are] cash forward contracts").
42. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (stating primary consideration is
whether contracts contemplate actual physical delivery, measured by objective obli-
gation and subjective intent); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (asserting contracts
that create legal obligation to make or take delivery are outside scope of CEA); see
also Iavarone, supra note 5, at 394 (observing issue is whether parties intended
HTA "as a mechanism for transferring title or . . . engag[ing] in price
speculation").
43. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 123 (observing HTAs are combination of
forward contract and short futures sale). For a further discussion of the features of
HTA contracts, see infra notes 44-78 and accompanying text.
44. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 123 (noting origins of HTAs).
45. See Iavarone, supra note 5, at 371-77 (comparing simple HTAs to newer,
more complex versions with features similar to futures contracts). One commenta-
tor asserted that the development of more complex variants was a result of compe-
tition among aggressive grain merchants responding to the anticipated downfall of
federal farm subsidy programs in the 1980s and the perceived need to extend
price stability beyond the terms of cash forward contracts. See id. at 371-72
(describing evolution of complex HTAs).
46. See id. at 390 (asserting HTA is ineffective as hedging instrument and is
useful only for speculation).
47. See Eby v. Producers Co-op, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 428, 430 n.1 (W.D. Mich.
1997) (describing simple HTA contract); lavarone, supra note 5, at 373 (same);
Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124 (same).
48. See Eby, 959 F. Supp. at 430 n.1 (describing simple HTA and basis); KOLB,
supra note 6, at 83 (defining basis); lavarone, supra note 5, at 373 (describing sim-
ple HTA); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124 (describing simple HTA and basis); Cole,
supra note 5, at 250 (defining basis).
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proaches. 49 Because the simple HTA allows the grain seller to set the basis
at any time prior to the delivery date, it gives the seller the security of a
relatively fixed price for the crops, plus the ability to play the market and
take advantage of the narrowing basis.50 For its part, the elevator will
hedge against a price drop by taking a short position in the futures market
corresponding to the quantity and delivery month of the HTA.51 Signifi-
cantly, although slightly more speculative than pure cash forward con-
tracts, simple HTAs do not alter in any way the parties' underlying delivery
and receipt obligations. 52
In contrast, newer HTAs increase the level of speculation of simple
HTAs by offering the farmer the ability to "roll" the delivery date into a
different month.5 3 Under these contracts, if the farmer elects to roll the
49. See KoLB, supra note 6, at 85-86 (demonstrating basis logically must dimin-
ish as delivery date approaches). Some factors that account for the difference be-
tween the local cash price and the futures price include transportation costs,
changes in government policies, weather and storage availability. See lavarone,
supra note 5, at 373 n.7 (defining basis). Holding other components constant, the
basis will reflect the transportation costs from the local market to the delivery site
of the futures market. See id.
50. See Ely, 959 F. Supp. at 430 n. 1 (describing simple HTA); lavarone, supra
note 5, at 374 (asserting simple HTA allowed farmers to speculate on basis); Cole,
supra note 5, at 250 (describing benefits of HTAs).
51. See Eby, 959 F. Supp. at 430 (describing elevator's ability to hedge against
price drop); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124 (same). Assume, for example, that on
May 1, the farmer and grain elevator enter into an HTA contract based on the
farmer's expectation of delivering 5000 bushels of corn in December. At that time
(May 1), the December futures price for corn is $2.50 per bushel and the local
cash price is $1.75 per bushel. The basis, therefore, is $.75 per bushel. The HTA
sets a base price of $2.50 per bushel (the current price of the December futures
contract), but the final price for the farmer's corn will not be set until the farmer
sets the basis, sometime before the delivery date. If on November 1, for instance,
the December futures price has risen to $2.75 per bushel and the local cash price
has risen to $2.25 per bushel, the basis has narrowed to $.50. At this time, the
farmer may wish to set the basis, securing a final selling price of $2.00 per bushel
(the $2.50 December futures price agreed to on May 1, minus the $.50 basis set on
November 1). See generally Iavarone, supra note 5, at 373 (asserting basis tends to
narrow as harvest approaches); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124 (providing example
of simple HTA in which elevator takes short position in futures market and farmer
sets basis).
52. See Iavarone, supra note 5, at 374 (asserting simple HTA, from point of
view of CEA, is virtually indistinguishable from cash forward contract).
53. SeeJohnson v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (recognizing HTAs permitted form of speculating); Barz v. Geneva Elevator
Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (recognizing HTAs' rolling feature
increases risk and allows producer to speculate); Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1043 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (same); In re Grain Land Coop.,
978 F. Supp. 1267, 1276-77 (D. Minn. 1997) (conceding producers claimed rolling
feature may have introduced inordinate risk); Countrymark Coop., Inc., v. Smith,
No. 5-97-21, 1997 WL 762813, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1997) (acknowledging
rolling feature increases risk and permits speculation); Division of Economic Analysis
Statement of Policy in Connection With the Unwinding of Certain Existing Contracts for the
Delivery of Grain and Statement of Guidance Regarding Certain Contracting Practices, 2
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,692, at 43,851 (1996) [hereinafter CFTC Interpreta-
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HTA to a later month, the elevator will cover the short futures position (by
purchasing a corresponding long position) and take a new short position
corresponding to the new delivery month. 54 Although the elevator covers
any margin requirements, it will deduct any losses on the futures transac-
tions, along with administrative fees, from the farmer's eventual selling
price. 55 For example, assume that a farmer and a grain elevator enter into
tive Statement] (concluding rolling can, in certain circumstances, create risk);
lavarone, supra note 5, at-376 (acknowledging rolling increases risk).
54. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1269 (describing roll feature); Eby,
959 F. Supp. at 430 (same); CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,851
(same); lavarone, supra note 5, at 375-76 (presenting example of how rolling
works); Cole, supra note 5, at 249-50 (same).
55. See Iavarone, supra note 5, at 374 (describing benefits of HTAs); Asklesen,
supra note 5, at 124-25 (describing fees and arrangements under HTAs); Cole,
supra note 5, at 247 (asserting elevators commonly cover margin costs under
HTAs). Margin is a good faith deposit of funds (usually cash or treasury securities)
intended to ensure traders will fulfill contractual obligations. See KOLB, supra note
6, at 10 (defining margin). In addition to the initial margin deposit required to
begin trading, there are also "maintenance" margins and "variation" margins. See
id. at 11 (describing types of margins).
Any adverse price movements in the futures market will decrease the value of
a trader's futures account.. See id. (describing effect of price changes on margin).
For every dollar by which a trader's account is reduced, a dollar is deducted from
the trader's margin deposit. See id. Thus, if price changes reduce the value of a
trader's futures account by $150, that same amount is deducted from the account's
margin. See id. (explaining margin). When the funds on deposit are reduced to a
certain level (the maintenance margin, usually 75% of the initial margin), the
trader faces a margin call. See id. (same). A margin call is a demand to deposit
sufficient additional funds in the margin account to restore the account to its ini-
tial level. See id. (same). The amount of funds required to restore the margin
account to its initial level is the variation margin. See id. (same).
Thus, an elevator engaged in an HTA with a farmer might experience the
following events: Having contracted to purchase 5000 bushels of corn at the cur-
rent December futures price of $2.50 per bushel (less basis as set by the farmer),
the elevator hedges against a price drop by selling short one December corn fu-
tures contract at $2.50. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124 (describing simple HTA
transaction). The value of this contract position is $12,500 (5000 bushels at $2.50
per bushel). A five percent initial margin would be $625. If the futures price rises
to $2.52 per bushel, the value of the elevator's short position is reduced by $100
(two cents per bushel times 5000 bushels), from $1250 to $1150. The $100 reduc-
tion in the position will be deducted from the $625 in the initial margin account,
reducing it to $525. If the December futures price drops down again, the increase
in value will similarly be replaced in the margin account.
If at any time, however, the net cumulative effect of upward and downward
movements causes the margin account to drop below its maintenance margin
(75% of its initial margin level), the elevator will have to face a margin call. The
elevator will then have to deposit variation margin sufficient to bring the margin
account back up to its initial level (notjust its maintenance level). Failure to do so
will result in the account being closed. See generally KOLB, supra note 6, at 11-12
(giving example of margin funds flow in futures trading accounts as price of un-
derlying commodity changes).
The additional problem with margin payments is that, once paid, they are not
refundable until the price moves in the trader's favor and the value of the position
increases. See Cole, supra note 5, at 253 (discussing margin calls). Thus, an eleva-
tor covering margin fees on a short position under an HTA risks accumulating
[Vol. 44: p. 125
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss1/3
1999]
an HTA anticipating July delivery. If, prior to the delivery date, the price
of the July futures contract drops while the December contract price re-
mains relatively high, the farmer may be able to benefit by rolling forward
into the December contract.56 In this situation, the farmer can take a
profit on closing out the short July futures position and still secure a high
base price for the sale of the underlying grain.57 Conversely, the farmer
may also benefit from a backwards roll (from a December futures contract
into a September futures contract, for instance) if futures prices move in
the other direction.5 8
The roll capability introduces three possible dangers. 59 First, it cre-
ates the temptation for a farmer to turn the HTA into a pure short futures
position by selling the crop on the cash market and rolling the HTA for-
ward to defer the delivery obligation until after the next harvest.6 0 By it-
self, such a situation is not particularly dangerous for either the farmer or
the elevator, which makes its own commitments in reliance on the
farmer's promise to deliver, as long as the farmer maintains the ability to
meet delivery obligations for crops committed under the HTA.6' Never-
margin costs until the farmer delivers the grain and enables the elevator to close
out the futures position. See id.
A similar problem with HTAs involves arranging the profits and losses on the
futures transactions associated with rolling. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 126-27
(describing effects of rolling HTAs); Cole, supra note 5, at 250 (same). If the
farmer chooses to roll the HTA under conditions that incur a loss on the transac-
tion, the elevator will pass the loss through to the farmer only when the contract is
fulfilled. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 126-27 (describing elevators' losses from
producers' decisions to roll). In the meantime, the elevator bears the financial
burden of carrying accumulated futures losses as well as accumulated margin costs
until the farmer delivers the grain. See id. at 126 (noting elevators bear losses on
futures transactions until farmer delivers grain and closes out HTA).
56. See generally Cole, supra note 5, at 249-50 (providing example of rolling
transaction under HTA in which farmer sells underlying commodity on cash mar-
ket). By way of illustration, assume that at the time the parties enter into the HTA,
the July futures price is $2.25 and the December price is $2.65. If the price of the
July futures contract drops to $2.00 and the December futures contract price drops
to $2.50, the roll will yield a $.25 per bushel profit for the farmer (less administra-
tive fees) on the futures transaction ($2.25 minus $2.00) and still enable the
farmer to secure a $2.50 base price (the December futures price at the time of the
roll).
57. See id. (describing rolling HTA).
58. See id. (providing example of rolling HTA).
59. For a discussion of the additional risks associated with rolling HTAs, see
infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
60. See Cole, supra note 5, at 250 (describing hypothetical operation of HTA);
see also CFFC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,851 (explaining HTA con-
tracts expose farmer to risk of futures losses when farmer cannot deliver grain).
61. See CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,851 (explaining risks
involved with short position when farmer is unable to deliver grain). Compared to
long positions, whose value can drop only to zero, pure short positions always carry
unlimited risk in that the position holder is obligated to buy back the underlying
commodity or a corresponding long position whose value has no upper limit. See
lavarone, supra note 5, at 378 n.32 (describing risk of short futures position).
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theless, elevators holding the short positions for the farmers are subject to
margin calls when futures prices rise and thus face a great deal of risk
when the farmer has no grain to deliver.62
The second danger is that rolling can expose farmers to the negative
market dynamics of multiple crop years. 63 A crop year is the twelve-month
period beginning when newly harvested grain is available and ending
when the next crop's harvest becomes available. 64 The crop year for corn
futures begins with the fall harvest and includes December, March, May
and July contracts with September as a transition month at the end of the
old crop year and the beginning of the new crop year.65 The danger lies
in the fact that different crop years for seasonal commodities are subject to
different market dynamics, and as a result, the farmer bears separate risks
in the cash market and the futures market. 66 When the parties use this
crop year's futures contract to establish the price of next year's corn, the
anticipated crop is subject to the market forces determining the price of
the next (new) crop year, while the elevator's short position (whose profits
or losses are passed on to the farmer) is subject to the market forces deter-
mining the price of the current (old) crop year.6 7 Thus, the farmer can
lose on both parts of the transaction. 68
62. See Cole, supra note 5, at 252 (describing financial strain on elevators from
margin calls on short futures positions that neither elevators nor farmers could
close out, in part because farmers had sold their crop on cash market).
63. See CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,850-51 (explaining
futures prices for different crop years can move independently of each other and
futures month chosen for purposes of setting HTA price may be in different crop
year than anticipated harvest); Iavarone, supra note 5, at 376-78 (asserting rolling
forces farmer to become exposed to different price dynamics of separate crop
years).
64. See CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,849 (defining crop
year).
65. See Iavarone, supra note 5, at 376 n.23 (describing crop year for corn).
66. See id. at 376-77 (describing increased risks of exposure to price dynamics
of different crop years).
67. See id. (discussing negative effects of establishing delivery price of grain
from new crop year on futures contract price of old crop year).
68. See id. (discussing possible result of new crop/old crop spread). A farmer
who uses an old crop year futures contract to price a new crop year harvest techni-
cally has what is known as a spread in the futures market. See id. (describing "bear
spread"). That is, the farmer has a long position in new crop corn futures and a
short position in old crop corn futures. See id. This hedge works for the farmer
when both "legs" tend to move in sympathy. See id. (discussing effect of spread
position). Thus, any drop in the cash price for the farmer's old crop corn (a loss
in the long position) is usually offset by a similar drop in the futures price of the
new crop corn (resulting in a profit in the short position). See id. (same). Never-
theless, old crop corn and new crop corn are subject to different market forces,
and both legs of the spread can move in opposite directions, resulting in a loss in
both positions. See id. (discussing effect of spread position when legs of spread
move independently of each other).
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The third danger arises because rolling enables farmers to make mul-
tiple futures transactions based on one contract for the sale of grain.69 As
a result, the farmer can accumulate futures losses that far outweigh any
offsetting profits from the sale of the underlying commodity, and the only
limit on those losses is the eventual obligation to deliver the grain and
close out the HTA. 70 Some argue, however, that rolling effectively elimi-
nates the ultimate obligation by allowing farmers to put off delivery indefi-
nitely. 71 Thus, the farmer has greater risk of incurring futures losses, and
the elevator's financial resources are placed in greater jeopardy.72 This
situation increases exposure to margin calls and decreases cash flow be-
cause the elevator is forced to absorb and carry losses on the futures trans-
actions until the farmer eventually delivers on the HTA.73
Some recognized these inherent dangers and attempted to warn of
the risks of irresponsible HTA dealings.7 4 Unfortunately, many failed to
heed the warnings and suffered tremendous losses as drastic price in-
creases in 1995 and 1996 exposed those risks. 75 Throughout 1995 and
1996, elevators felt the increasing financial pressure of carrying farmers'
accumulated futures losses resulting from liberal rolling of HTA contracts
in previous years and repeated margin calls on their open short positions
69. See Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1043 (N.D.
Iowa 1998) (acknowledging rolling may result in futures transactions without par-
allel transactions in underlying grain).
70. See Cole, supra note 5, at 251-52 (noting farmers' losses grew with each roll
in 1996). Farmers who stood to incur losses due to price increases in 1996 rolled
their HTAs rather than deliver and take the loss. See id. (discussing events of
1996). As prices continued to rise, however, the farmers stood to lose even more if
they closed out their HTAs. See id. Thus, farmers found themselves in the position
of having to keep rolling in the hopes that prices would come down and enable
them to close out their HTAs without incurring even greater losses. See id.
71. See Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (stating Oeltenbrun argued that
allowing unlimited rolling nullified delivery requirement); In re Grain Land Coop.,
978 F. Supp. 1267, 1277 (D. Minn. 1997) (addressing producers' argument that
rolling eliminates delivery requirement); see also Iavarone, supra note 5, at 400 (as-
serting farmer is not required to deliver under flex HTA).
72. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1270 (noting costs associated with
rolling put elevator in difficult financial position); see also Asklesen, supra note 5, at
126 .(explaining elevators bear costs of rolling until producer delivers grain and
closes out HTA); Cole, supra note 5, at 252 (observing elevators face bankruptcy if
unable to cover futures positions due to farmers' failure to deliver grain). For a
further discussion of futures-related financial strains on elevators, see supra note 55
and accompanying text.
73. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 126-27 (noting strain on elevators of bearing
futures losses and "enormous" margin calls); Cole, supra note 5, at 252-53 (discuss-
ing burden of margin calls on elevators).
74. See CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,851-52 (identifying
"prudent" and "imprudent" risk-reduction activities); Iavarone, supra note 5, at 378
n.35, 388 n.68 (noting warnings issued by National Grain & Feed Association).
75. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 127-28 (discussing severe economic losses
suffered in 1996 from HTAs); Cole, supra note 5, at 243-44 (providing individual
examples of HTA-related losses).
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triggered by the rising grain prices.76 Threatened with financial ruin, ele-
vators sought to force farmers to deliver grain committed under HTAs and
close out their futures positions, only to find that many farmers had sold
that year's crop, had HTA commitments far in excess of what they could
possibly deliver or both. 77 The inability of both sides to withstand further
losses under these contracts led to the current outbreak of litigation. 78
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Cash Forward Exclusion
The CEA provides no guidance for understanding the distinction be-
tween "contracts for future delivery" and "sales of cash commodities for
deferred shipment or delivery."79 As a result, courts have developed their
own understanding of the cash forward exception through case law.80
In In re Stovall,8 1 the first major case dealing with the cash forward
exclusion, the court identified six features of a futures contract falling
within the regulatory reach of the CEA.82 That court observed that all six
76. See Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1270 (noting Grain Land's financial
difficulties from costs associated with rolling); see also Asklesen, supra note 5, at
127-28 (noting strain on elevators from margin calls).
77. SeeJohnson v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (noting farmers' commitments under HTAs exceeded annual production
and farmers sold corn on cash market then rolled their HTAs); Grain Land Coop.,
978 F. Supp. at 1270 (describing Grain Land's attempts to enforce farmers' deliv-
ery obligations); see also Asklesen, supra note 5, at 127-28 (discussing lawsuits trig-
gered by elevators' attempts to force farmers to deliver grain); Cole, supra note 5,
at 252 (discussing pressures on elevators that forced them to make demands on
farmers). In many cases, the farmers could not deliver because they had either
committed more grain to HTA contracts than they could produce or sold their
grain on the cash market and rolled their contracts intending to deliver on them
in the next crop year. See id. (discussing lack of grain to fulfill HTA obligations).
78. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 127 (noting number of lawsuits resulting
from developments of 1995 and 1996); Cole, supra note 5, at 252 (describing eleva-
tors' demands on farmers).
79. For a further discussion regarding this distinction, see supra notes 38-40
and accompanying text.
80. See Gilberg, supra note 27, at 1605 (stating definition has been left to
CFTC and courts).
81. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at
23,777 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979).
82. See id. (describing commodity futures transactions). Stovall was charged
with soliciting and accepting orders for illegal futures contracts. See id. at 23,776.
The Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ") found that Stovall directed his business pri-
marily at the general public as opposed to customers interested in trading the
actual underlying commodities. See id. at 23,778. Because only one customer ever
took delivery, which represented a small portion of the customer's transactions
(and an even smaller portion of Stovall's), the court found that the contracts were
never intended to transfer ownership of the commodities. See id. (noting few of
Stovall's transactions were motivated by desire to trade actual commodities). The
ALJ also found that Stovall promoted the contracts for speculative purposes. See id.
(asserting Stovall's transactions were used and promoted as means of speculation).
In addition, Stovall's contracts were standardized like futures contracts traded
on registered exchanges. See id. at 23,778-79. Once the customer chose a delivery
month, a program determined the exact delivery date, location, contract size and
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features need not be present."3 According to the court, futures contracts
are: 1) standardized contracts for the purchase or sale of a commodity; 2)
for future, as opposed to immediate delivery; 3) directly or indirectly of-
fered to the general public; and 4) generally secured by earnest money, or
"margin."8 4 Fifth, the purpose of a futures contract is to shift risk rather
than to transfer ownership. 85 Sixth and finally, although the parties may
eventually perform on the contract, the ability to offset effectively removes
the delivery obligation. 86 The court contrasted these characteristics with
cash forward contracts in which the parties expected actual delivery of the
commodity and in which "[t]he seller would necessarily have the ability to
deliver and the buyer would have the ability to accept delivery in fulfill-
ment of the contract."8 7
A few years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit addressed the distinction between cash forward and futures con-
tracts in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Co Petro Marketing Group,
Inc.88 The court found the distinction was initially drawn to "meet a par-
ticular need such as that of a farmer to sell part of next season's harvest at
a set price."8 9 The court described a party to a cash forward contract as
one for whom the commodity has "inherent value," as evidenced by the
ability to make or take delivery of the commodity. 90 The court also noted
that while standardization is an important feature of futures contracts, the
rigid uniformity of contracts traded on licensed exchanges is not neces-
sary.91 Rather, the ability to nullify the delivery obligation through offset-
handling fees. See id. Most importantly, almost every contract was offset by an
equal and opposite contract between Stovall and the customer, with a cash transac-
tion settling any gain or loss. See id. As the court noted, "this lack of delivery is the
clearest indication that the contracts were not cash commodity contracts for de-
ferred shipment or delivery." Id. at 27,779.
83. See id. (asserting futures contracts need not include all elements
mentioned).
84. See id. at 23,777 (describing common features of futures contracts).
85. See id. (discussing primary purpose of futures contracts).
86. See id. (noting common use of offsetting transactions to extinguish deliv-
ery obligations in futures contracts).
87. Id. The court noted that the major difference between "excluded cash
commodity-deferred delivery" contracts and futures contracts is that delivery is a
"generally fulfilled expectation" of excluded contracts, but is rarely fulfilled in fu-
tures contracts. Id. at 27,778.
88. 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982). Co Petro sold contracts to the general pub-
lic for future delivery of petroleum products. See id. at 576. Under these "Agency
Agreements," the customer would appoint Co Petro as agent to purchase a specific
quantity and type of fuel at a fixed price to be delivered at an agreed upon date.
See id. The customer then paid a deposit and could later take delivery, appoint Co
Petro to sell the fuel or cancel the contract and pay liquidated damages provided
for in the contract. See id. at 577, 580.
89. Id. at 577.
90. See id. at 578 (describing buyer in cash forward contract).
91. See id. at 580-81 (admitting contracts were not as standardized as those
traded on licensed exchanges, but nonetheless were sufficiently uniform to consti-
tute futures contracts). The Agency Agreements were traded in multiples of uni-
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ting contracts is essential.9 2 Other means of nullifying, such as canceling
the contract and paying liquidated damages, can also be characteristic of a
futures contract.9 3
The Ninth Circuit again dealt with the cash forward exclusion in In re
Bybee.94 In that case, the court interpreted its previous ruling in Co Petro as
requiring subjective intent to deliver and an objective showing of a deliv-
ery obligation.9 5 The court also took note of CFTC releases recognizing
that parties who contemplate delivery and are capable of making or taking
delivery may nevertheless settle instead by cash payment. 96 Such "book-
out" agreements, however, are usually characterized by the following: 1)
they are separately negotiated; 2) they are not provided for in the terms of
the contract; and 3) any party in the chain of distribution may still require
delivery.97 Thus, in recognition of economic realities, the court held that
the cash forward exception could still apply in some cases even when the
parties nullify the delivery obligation. 98
form basic units of volume, prices were set unilaterally at then-prevailing market
rates and important dates for delivery and notification were mostly uniform. See id.
Considering this degree of standardization, the court found the Agency Agree-
ments offset and cancellation provisions enabled customers to trade in futures free
of delivery obligations. See id. at 580 (noting purpose of standardization in futures
contracts is to facilitate offsetting and recognizing Co Petro was obliged to execute
such transactions).
92. See id. (noting standardization of futures contracts is important to facili-
tate offsetting transactions).
93. See id. (treating liquidation as means of canceling delivery obligation in
Agency Agreements).
94. 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991). Bybee purchased precious metals from a
supplier under a "Deferred Delivery" plan and resold them to retail customers. See
id. at 310-11. Bybee made a down payment and the supplier secured the balance
due with a lien on all undelivered metals. See id. Final delivery was scheduled to
take place upon final payment of the full balance. See id. Even though the con-
tracts were not completely standardized, the court determined they were futures
contracts because the supplier was willing to offset them. See id. at 313 (holding
transactions were futures contracts because of implicit provision for offset). None-
theless, the court determined that they satisfied the cash forward exception be-
cause each party could still enforce the other party's legal obligation to make or
take delivery. See id. at 315 (holding exchange trading requirement inapplicable
because parties retained delivery obligations).
95. See id. at 313 (describing holding in Co Petro).
96. See Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed.
Reg. 39,188, 39,191 (1990) [hereinafter Statutory Interpretation] (observing con-
tracts between commercial parties may serve same functions as valid cash forward
contracts, notwithstanding ultimate settlement in form of cash payment); Regula-
tion of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,022, 47,027 (1987) [here-
inafter Regulation of Hybrid Instruments] (recognizing contracts in which parties
are capable of fulfilling delivery obligations may occasionally be settled without
delivery pursuant to privately negotiated agreements between principals).
97. See Bybee, 945 F.2d at 314 (providing description of "bookout" agree-
ments). A "bookout" agreement offsets the contractual delivery obligation with
newly agreed upon consideration (usually cash). See id.
98. See id. at 315 (concluding cash forward exception applied to Deferred De-
livery contracts). The Statutory Interpretation noted that regulation of futures con-
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The Ninth Circuit examined cash forward and futures contracts yet
again in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Noble Metals International,
Inc.99 The court acknowledged the previously recognized reality that the
mere appearance of a delivery obligation would not suffice to bring con-
tracts within the cash forward exception. 10 0 By their terms, the contracts
may indicate a binding delivery obligation and satisfy the cash forward ex-
clusion, but the courts may place greater emphasis on the parties' actual
conduct under the contracts. 10 1
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa first
addressed the possible application of the cash forward exclusion to HTAs
in Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors, Inc.10 2 In Oeltjenbrun, the court determined
that the HTAs in question were valid cash forward contracts, primarily
based on evidence that the contracts contemplated actual delivery of the
commodity because the parties were engaged in the business of producing
and trading grain, the parties were capable of making and taking delivery
and the commodity had "inherent value" to them.1 0 3 Additionally, the
court concluded that because the contracts contained no specific provi-
tracts should not extend to commercial contracts with enforceable delivery
obligations "in which delivery is deferred for commercial convenience and neces-
sity." Statutory Interpretation, supra note 96, at 39,190.
99. 67 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995). Under the defendants' "Forward Delivery
Program," a customer, drawn from the general public, purchased the right and
obligation to receive specified quantities of precious metals at an agreed-on price.
See id. at 769. The customer paid a 15% "administrative fee." See id. Upon pay-
ment of the contract price, the customer received title to the metals. See id. The
contracts stipulated that performance of the delivery obligation was mandatory
and that offsetting transactions were prohibited. See id. Despite these provisions,
the defendants arranged for customers to liquidate their positions through a third
party who would sell the metals back to the defendants. See id.
100. See id. at 773 (finding parties had no legitimate expectation of delivery,
and thus contracts were subject to CEA despite superficial obligation to perform
and prohibition on offsetting transactions); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
v. American Metal Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168, 192 (D.N.J. 1988) (finding in-
vestment program in which delivery rarely occurred and could be avoided through
offset or liquidation involved futures contracts despite superficial requirement of
actual delivery); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Morgan, Harris & Scott,
Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (asserting that "self-serving labels that
[parties] choose to give their contracts should not deter the conclusion that their
contracts are [futures contracts]").
101. See Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 772-73 (rejecting argument that paper transfer
of title satisfied delivery obligation); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co
Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The transaction must
be viewed as a whole with a critical eye toward its underlying purpose.").
102. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (N.D. Iowa 1998). In 1995, Bradley Oeltjenbrun, a
grain farmer in central Iowa, committed 120,000 bushels of corn to HTA contracts
with three different grain elevators. See id. at 1028-29 (reviewing contracts between
parties). The specificity of the delivery obligations varied with each elevator. See
id. at 1039-45 (describing contracts' provisions in detail). Oeltjenbrun rolled each
HTA at least once, but only delivered some of the grain under the contracts. See id.
at 1029-30 (discussing parties' performance under contracts).
103. See id. at 1039-40, 1042, 1044-46 (discussing evidence of delivery obliga-
tion in each contract).
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sions regarding rolling, the rolls executed were similar to the separate,
individually negotiated bookout agreements in Bybee.10 4 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the same court faced some of the same issues in Top of Iowa. 0 5
III. THE FACTS OF ToP OF IOWA COOPERATVE V. SCJEWE
In the spring and summer of 1995, Virgil E. Schewe, a farmer in Free-
born County, Minnesota, entered into five contracts with Top of Iowa Co-
operative.' 0 6 All five contracts were of the same standardized form and
had individual entries filled in by hand.'0 7 Each contract acknowledged
that Top of Iowa had taken, on Schewe's behalf, a short position on the
Chicago Board of Trade.' 08 The individual entries, filled in separately for
each of the contracts, detailed the commodity (corn), the quantity, the
futures delivery month (month in which Schewe anticipated delivering the
grain) and the current futures price for that delivery month. 10 9 Beyond a
statement that "' It] his is NOT considered a credit sale contract as long as
final price is determined before delivery,"' the contracts did not directly
reference any obligation to deliver grain to the elevator."10 The contracts
also contained no specific provision allowing Schewe to roll the contract
into any other month. 11'
Schewe attempted to deliver his grain in the fall of 1995, but could
not do so because the elevator was full."12 Schewe then rolled the con-
tracts into the spring of 1996 and the HTAs were repriced accordingly." 13
Schewe canceled the contracts on May 31, 1996, asserting that Top of Iowa
had breached by changing the terms of the roll." 4 Schewe never deliv-
ered any grain on the contracts. 1 15
104. See id. at 1043-44, 1047 (comparing rolling of HTAs to bookout agree-
ments and determining that rolling has even smaller effect on delivery obligation
than bookouts).
105. See Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
106. See id. at 847 (describing nature of relationship between parties).
107. See id. at 847-48 (describing HTA contracts between Schewe and Top of
Iowa).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 848.
110. Id. at 854 (quoting Complaint 9, Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (No.
C 96-3146-MWB)). The HTAs make reference, however, to an attached "Grain
Purchase Contract and Confirmation" that may have included more specific deliv-
ery information, but neither party provided a copy of it. See id. at 848. The man-
ager of one of the grain elevators in Oeltjenbrun asserted that the Grain Purchase
Contract and Confirmation was never attached until the seller established the final
sales price by setting the basis. See Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d
1024, 1046 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
111. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (noting contract did not specifically
provide for rolling).
112. See id. (adding neither party disputed elevator was full).
113. See id. (noting factual dispute regarding which party requested rolling
HTAs).
114. See id. at 848-49 (explaining why Schewe canceled contracts).
115. See id. (noting that no grain was ever delivered on any contracts).
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At trial, both parties filed motions for summaryjudgment on the issue
of whether the HTAs were illegal off-exchange futures contracts or
whether they came within the cash forward exclusion.
116
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
The court began its analysis of the issue by citing the proposition that
"self-serving labels . . . should not deter the court" from determining
whether particular contracts are futures contracts.'1 7 The court then ac-
knowledged the Ninth Circuit's observation in Co Petro that "'no bright-
line definition or list of characterizing elements is determinative"' of
whether a contract is a cash forward contract or a futures contract and that
"'[t] he transaction must be viewed as a whole with a critical eye toward its
underlying purpose.' "118
Next, the court cited its previous decision in Oeltjenbrun, recalling that
the issue in cases dealing with the cash forward exclusion was whether
there was any obligation to deliver. 119 As in Oeltjenbrun, the court found
that the obligation to deliver in the present case was, at best, implied.
120
The obligation in Top of Iowa was only an inference based on the details of
the futures transaction and an oblique reference to delivery in the last
paragraph of the contract.' 2 1 The court noted, however, that Schewe had
repeatedly asserted his intent to deliver grain under the contract.1 2 2 The
116. See id. at 847.
117. Id. at 853 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Noble Metals
Int'l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 773 (9th Cir. 1995)).
118. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg.
Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1982)).
119. See id. at 854 (reviewing Oeltjenbrun decision); see also In re Bybee, 945
F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting cash forward exclusion was intended to apply
only to contracts in which parties expect delivery of actual commodity); Co Petro,
680 F.2d at 578 (emphasizing fact that parties to cash forward contracts deal in and
contemplate delivery of actual commodity).
120. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (finding only implied obligation to
deliver); Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1046 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (observing Oeltjenbrun's obligation to deliver under HTAs as "an infer-
ence" arising from contract's terms "that the transaction concerns a specified
quantity of grain of a specified condition with a specified 'Arrival Period,' 'Destina-
tion,' and 'Futures Option Price"').
121. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (describing indirect references to
delivery obligation under HTAs).
122. See id. at 855 (believing Schewe "stated repeatedly that his intention was
to make actual physical delivery"). The court relied on Schewe's statements of
subjective intent to establish the existence of a binding delivery obligation in much
the same way that other courts have looked to the parties' course of performance
to determine the lack of a delivery obligation. See id. ("[T]he parties' intention
that delivery occur clarifies any uncertainty as to an actual delivery obligation
under the ambiguous terms of the HTAs."); Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 772-73 (deter-
mining that defendants had no legitimate expectation that customers would take
delivery based on fact that very few of "vast number of purchasers ... contem-
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court went on to explain that the HTAs here were between parties who
were engaged in the business of producing, buying and selling grain and
were capable of making and taking delivery of the commodity. 123 The
grain contracts thus had inherent value to the parties by providing for the
sale of some of the farmer's crop and providing the elevator with a source
of supply for its business. 124
Because the HTAs in the present case contained no express provision
either permitting or forbidding rolling, the court held that, at most, the
elevator voluntarily permitted it.125 Because the elevator executed the
rolls voluntarily, the court found rolling in this instance analogous to the
bookout agreements discussed in Bybee (i.e., individually negotiated and
separate from the HTAs themselves). 126 Significantly, although Top of
Iowa permitted rolls in administering the HTAs, it was not legally obliged
to do so.' 27 As a result, the court reasoned that the rolls did not negate
the delivery requirement.' 28
plated actual delivery"); Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 580 (determining customers' ability to
offset or liquidate positions eliminated delivery obligation).
In this area of law, it is well recognized that the wording of the contracts is
rarely a credible indication of actual intent. See Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 773 (re-
jecting reliance on "self-serving labels") (citing Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. American Metal Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168, 192 (D.N.J. 1988));
Melchert v. American Union Tel. Co., 11 F. 193, 196 (D. Iowa 1882) (acknowledg-
ing parties to illegal futures contracts "will always seek to give them the form and
semblance of legality"). Nevertheless, it is equally well recognized that some par-
ties to futures contracts occasionally deliver the actual commodity. See In re Stovall,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,777
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1979) ("[A] party to a commodity futures contract may eventually
perform on the contract .... ); H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 129 (1974) (asserting less
than three percent of futures contracts are settled by delivery); KOLB, supra note 6,
at 15 (discussing delivery as means of settling futures contract, but noting that "in
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1989, only about one-half of one percent of
all contracts traded were settled by either physical delivery or cash settlement")
(citing COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 101 (1989)).
Thus, Schewe's intent to deliver may establish that the HTAs were valid cash for-
ward contracts only in his case. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (asserting
court must examine each case individually). It is still possible that Top of Iowa
generally contemplated HTAs with other parties as off-exchange futures transac-
tions. See lavarone, supra note 5, at 396 (arguing determination of validity of eleva-
tor's HTAs should include examination of elevator's dealings with all customers).
123. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (discussing evidence that actual
delivery was purpose of contracts).
124. See id. (discussing principal purpose of contracts).
125. See id. at 856 (determining that rolling did not negate delivery obligation
while indicating HTAs in question were futures contracts because both parties re-
tained right to demand performance).
126. See id. (analogizing this case with previous Ninth Circuit case); see also In
re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing bookout agreements).
127. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (discussing decision to roll HTAs).
For a discussion of market pressures that may effectively oblige elevators to roll at
the customers' insistence, see infra note 155 and accompanying text.
128. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (holding that delivery obligation still
existed).
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Schewe asserted that the court in Oeltjenbrun found that the HTAs in
question were valid cash forward contracts merely because the parties in-
volved were a farmer and a grain elevator.' 29 Such reasoning, he claimed,
excluded farmers from regulatory protection against commodities
fraud. °3 0 In response, the court clarified its position that the parties' oc-
cupations demonstrated their ability to make and take delivery and the
inherent value of the grain to them, and it was this fact that evidenced the
actual delivery obligation under the HTAs.13 '
Schewe next asserted that the court improperly concluded that a
farmer necessarily had the ability to deliver under the HTAs because "any
number of factors could have eliminated (a farmer's] ability to make deliv-
ery" between the time the contracts were written and the time when per-
formance became due.' 32 In response, the court pointed out that the
proper consideration was not whether the farmer would be "absolutely
certain to deliver," but whether, by virtue of their occupations and engage-
ment in the business, the parties were likely to intend actual delivery
under the contract.' 33 In support of this point, the court reasoned that
even cash forward contracts would be subject to regulation if the absolute
certainty of delivery was the consideration.13 4
B. Critical Analysis
The district court properly limited its analysis to the facts and argu-
ments presented in the case. 13 5 Given the specific facts of the case and
129. See id. at 857.
130. See id. (reviewing Schewe's assertions).
131. See id. (stating that Schewe's assertions ignore plain language of
contracts).
132. Id. at 857-58 (alteration in original) (citing Defendant's Reply Memoran-
dum at 3, Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (No. C 96-3146-MWB)).
133. See id. at 858 (expanding issue to whether "they would be likely to pro-
duce and deliver").
134. See id. (noting that even cash forward contracts could not meet certainty
requirement).
135. See id. at 846 (recognizing court's analysis may differ in each case be-
cause HTAs may differ from case to case); Iavarone, supra note 5, at 393 (asserting
that inquiry into validity of HTAs is "a factual question that frequently depends on
the course of dealing between the parties... [and] must proceed on an elevator
by elevator process"). Limited as it was to the specific facts of the case, the court
was not required to deal with other possible situations in which the current tests
would be of little help. One such case involves a farmer who has produced grain in
the past, but only to feed livestock. See id. at 396 n.94 (citing Complaint and No-
tice of Hearing at 6-7, In re Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Minn. 1997)
(No. 3-96-1209) (alleging elevator entered HTAs with hog farmers who grew grain
to feed hogs)). Although engaged in the business of producing the underlying
commodity, he may not truly have had the requisite intent to deliver. See id. Other
cases involve farmers who enter HTAs with elevators for quantities significantly
beyond their ability to produce and deliver in any one or two years. SeeJohnson v.
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990-92 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (recognizing as
undisputed fact that farmers with combined annual production capacity of 125,000
bushels of corn committed over 440,000 bushels of corn to HTAs under multiyear
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the considerations established by precedent as the proper guidelines for
determining whether contracts come within the cash forward exclusion,
the court's analysis and ruling were appropriate. 13 6 The parties involved
appear to be the quintessential parties to a cash forward contract.1 3 7 Fur-
thermore, significant evidence was presented to satisfy the prevailing test
for validity, namely that the parties expected actual delivery of the physical
commodity under the contract.13 8
The facts of Top of Iowa tend to satisfy the dual requirements of sub-
jective intent and objective delivery obligation as set forth in Bybee.139
Schewe expressed his intent to deliver on more than one occasion. 140
Although the HTAs did not set a specific delivery date, the general expec-
tation of delivery was implicit in the use of such terms as "arrival period"
and "designated arrival period" and the phrase "[t] his is NOT considered
a credit sale contract as long as final price is determined before
delivery."14 1
Certain aspects considered to be characteristic of futures contracts
were also missing. 142 The parties never attempted to nullify the delivery
obligation through offsetting transactions, aside from rolling the con-
tracts. 143 In addition, Top of Iowa was an elevator engaged in the business
of buying and selling grain, and Schewe was a grain producer.'4 4 The
program); Iavarone, supra note 5, at 390 n.75 (citing Complaint, Gunderson v.
ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 976 F. Supp. 818, 820-21 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (No. C 96-
3148-MWB) (alleging 54 farmers with combined yearly production of 3,579,000
bushels committed 8,353,000 bushels of corn to HTAs)). Although they may sat-
isfy the established criteria, they may have no actual intent to deliver, or the intent
to deliver may be secondary to a more immediate speculative purpose. See Land
O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 990-92 (acknowledging farmers' commitments under
HTAs exceeded production capacity).
136. For a discussion of the principal cases dealing with the cash forward ex-
clusion, see supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
court's analysis and holding in Top of Iowa, see supra notes 117-34 and accompany-
ing text.
137. For a discussion of the relationship between the parties' business and the
original purpose of the cash forward exclusion, see infra notes 144-46,- supra note
34 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of the role that the delivery obligation plays in ajudicial
determination of whether contracts satisfy the cash forward exclusion, see supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the evidence tending to
establish Schewe's intent to deliver under the contracts, see supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
139. See In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1991).
140. For a discussion of delivery issues and Schewe's expressions of intent to
deliver, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
141. Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847-48 (N.D. Iowa
1998).
142. For a discussion of the characteristics of futures contracts, see supra
notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
143. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 847-49 (describing parties' conduct with
regard to HTAs in question).
144. See id. at 847 (describing background of parties).
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parties were capable of making and taking delivery, and the underlying
grain had inherent value to them. 145 Considering that the cash forward
exclusion was designed specifically to protect commodities producers and
dealers carrying out their normal transactions from the burdens and inter-
ference of regulation, the parties were the quintessential parties to a legiti-
mate cash forward contract.14 6
The court, however, did not address a number of other issues. For
instance, what did the language in the HTAs' second paragraph stating
that "BUYER confirms the following futures transaction was made for
seller today on the Chicago Board of Trade" mean? 1 47 This language
could indicate that the HTA is merely a thinly veiled attempt to disguise a
futures contract and bypass the exchange trading requirement of the
CEA.148 When the farmer or the elevator makes a futures transaction on
its own account, either party can be seen as hedging its position vis-A-vis
the underlying grain contract. 1 49 When, as here, the elevator makes the
transaction on the farmer's behalf, it raises the suspicion that the elevator
is using the HTA as a means of providing a futures brokerage service to
the farmer.150 Here, this view is strengthened because the HTAs in ques-
145. See id. at 855-56; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg.
Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 129-
30 (1974) (describing parties for whom commodity in contract has "inherent
value")).
146. For a discussion of the history of the cash forward exclusion, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
147. Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
148. See Iavarone, supra note 5, at 397-98 (arguing that elevators initiating fu-
tures contracts on farmers' behalf act like "Futures Commission Merchants," "ac-
cepting orders for commodity futures contracts and extending credit"); see also
KOLB, supra note 6, at 51 (defining Futures Commission Merchant as "a firm or
individual that accepts orders to trade futures on behalf of another party and who
accepts money to support such an order").
149. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 249
(1905) (describing hedging as means of using futures market to reduce risk of
position in market for commodity); KoLB, supra note 6, at 25 (defining hedging);
Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199 (same); Cole, supra note 5, at 246 (same).
Hedgers are often directly involved in trading the underlying commodity. See
Board of Trade, 198 U.S. at 249 (describing hedging as means by which grain
merchants protect against price fluctuations); KOLB, supra note 6, at 6 (asserting
hedgers are often involved in producing and using underlying commodity); Solo-
mon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199 (same). In a typical hedge, a party with a long
position in the underlying commodity would take a corresponding short position
in the futures market for the same commodity. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 25-26
(discussing typical hedge transaction); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199 &
n.67 (same); Cole, supra note 5, at 246 (same). If the price of the underlying
commodity drops, the loss will be offset by a gain in the short futures position. See
KOLB, supra note 6, at 25-26 (discussing typical hedge transaction); Solomon &
Dicker, supra note 8, at 199 & n.67 (same). This relationship enables hedgers to
reduce their price risk, effectively locking in prices well in advance of harvest or
delivery. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 25 (describing how hedgers reduce their price
risk); Solomon & Dicker, supra note 8, at 199 & n.67 (same).
150. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (indicating that elevator made fu-
tures transaction on Schewe's behalf); see also KOLB, supra note 6, at 27 (noting that
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tion made no explicit reference to any delivery obligation, but addressed
aspects of the futures transactions in detail and assigned profits and losses
on the futures transactions to the farmer. 151
The problem with this argument is that, while Top of Iowa may have
been providing brokerage-like services, it was not operating exactly like a
typical brokerage. 152 Significantly, the HTAs assigned responsibility for
commissions and margin requirements to the elevator. 153 Normally, bro-
kerages do not cover such costs for their clients. 1 54 It is likely that Top of
Iowa did so under these HTAs in an effort to compete for their customers'
grain business. 155 In addition, the HTAs imply and Schewe expressed di-
rectly a general understanding that the underlying grain eventually would
be delivered.' 56 Typical brokerages have no interest in whether grain is
ever delivered on the futures transactions they execute. 15 7 In fact, most
brokerages are strictly financial intermediaries and have neither the ability
customer gains access to trading directly through broker); Iavarone, supra note 5,
at 397-98 (asserting that elevators taking futures positions on behalf of farmers act
as Futures Commission Merchants); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124-25 (stating eleva-
tors not only act as brokers and earn income from trading futures contracts for
farmers, but also exercise certain competitive advantages over brokers who are sub-
ject to risk disclosure requirements and are prohibited from absorbing customers'
margin calls).
151. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (indicating responsibility for margin
calls and commissions was assigned to elevator under HTA with Schewe).
Although the facts do not indicate that losses on the futures transactions were to
be passed through to Schewe under the HTAs, such is usually the case. See Cole,
supra note 5, at 246-47 (noting farmers commonly assume responsibility for gains
or losses from futures transactions under HTAs).
152. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 6 (distinguishing between hedgers, who often
are producers or users of commodities, and brokers, who typically only execute
trades).
153. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (indicating that elevator assumed
responsibility for margin calls and commissions).
154. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 11-13 (discussing operation of margin system in
futures markets and indicating that traders, not brokers, are generally responsible
for margin requirements). In fact, when a trader fails or refuses to post required
margin amounts, the broker normally will close the trader's account. See id.
(describing results of trader's failure to meet margin requirements). But see As-
klesen, supra note 5, at 125 (asserting that elevators earn income from executing
futures transactions for farmers and that ability to absorb margin calls is competi-
tive advantage that elevators have over futures brokers).
155. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 9, Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (No. C-96-3146-MWB)
(characterizing speculative features of HTAs as "misguided attempt [by elevators]
to outdo each other in a race to capture market share by any means necessary"); see
also Iavarone, supra note 5, at 374-75 (noting origins of HTAs in competition
among grain elevators). But see Asklesen, supra note 5, at 124-25 (discussing eleva-
tors' advantages over brokerages in competition for farmers' futures transactions).
156. For a discussion of the delivery obligation under the HTAs in question
and the parties' intent to carry it out, see supra notes 119-22 and accompanying
text.
157. See KOLB, supra note 6, at 6 (distinguishing between hedgers and
brokers).
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nor the desire to accept grain deliveries. 158 Thus, although Top of Iowa's
HTAs offered Schewe access to the futures market, it does not necessarily
follow that the HTAs were intended solely as a means of eluding CFTC
oversight of speculative futures transactions. 159 Nevertheless, the futures
transaction on the farmer's behalf leaves a strong impression that the con-
tract may have been intended to provide the farmer with speculative
opportunities. 
160
Another issue the court did not adequately address is the degree to
which Top of Iowa's HTAs contain predetermined, standardized terms. 16
1
This is important because standardization facilitates offsetting transactions
that nullify the delivery obligation.1 6 2 Standardized terms raise the suspi-
cion that the HTAs are really futures contracts. 163 In other cases dealing
with the cash forward exception, the courts have specified standardization
as a characteristic of futures contracts and individually negotiated terms as
a hallmark of cash forward contracts.
164
The court also stated without further analysis that Top of Iowa's HTAs
"involve [d] individually negotiated terms."165 These HTAs, however, were
preprinted forms with blank spaces to be filled in by the parties. 166 The
blank spaces were filled in with information pertaining to specific futures
contracts available on the Chicago Board of Trade. 167 Assuming Schewe
158. See id.
159. For a discussion of the evidence indicating that the parties intended to
transfer the actual underlying grain, see supra notes 122-24, 138-41 and accompa-
nying text.
160. For a discussion of the possibility that elevators use HTA contracts as a
means of providing brokerage services to farmers, see supra notes 150-59 and ac-
companying text.
161. For a discussion of the extent to which the terms of the HTAs in ques-
tion were nonnegotiable, see supra notes 106-09, infra notes 165-69 and accompa-
nying text.
162. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group,
Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 580 (9th. Cir 1982) (stating standardization of contracts facili-
tates offsetting, which is essential because investors rarely take delivery) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 129 (1974)).
163. See In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,707, at 26,780 (CFTC Apr. 29, 1983) (determining cash
forward exclusion did not apply to contract, in part because of standardization and
lack of individually negotiated terms); In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,777 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979) ("Commodity
futures transactions involve standardized contracts . . . ."); Characteristics Distin-
guishing Cash and Forward Contracts and "Trade" Options, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656,
39,658 (1985) (noting that forward contracts are frequently not standardized).
164. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (dis-
tinguishing between standardized futures contracts and individually negotiated
cash forward contracts); Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 580 (referring to "classic elements of
a standardized futures contract").
165. Top of Iowa Coop v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 855 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
166. See id. at 847-48 (providing example of form of contract that Schewe en-
tered into with Top of Iowa).
167. See id. at 848 (laying out document).
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knew the approximate quantity and delivery month he desired, most of
the remaining terms were set by the corresponding futures contract.1 68
The only term open to negotiation was the delivery destination, which
could be rendered moot'by an offsetting transaction.
1 69
Schewe's HTAs, in fact, were somewhat similar to the Agency Agree-
ments found to be futures contracts in Co Petro.1 70 Like Top of Iowa Coop-
erative, the broker in Co Petro was engaged in the business of buying and
selling the underlying commodity (petroleum products). 171 As with
Schewe's HTAs, Co Petro's Agency Agreements were capable of offset be-
cause most of the terms were predetermined and standardized. 172
Standardization, however, is not a dispositive characteristic of futures
contracts.1 7 3 The delivery obligation in a standardized contract may be
every bit as binding as an individually negotiated contract.1 7 4 Other fac-
tors, particularly the parties' course of performance under the contracts,
can give a clearer indication of actual intent.1 75 For instance, although
the customers in Noble Metals were ostensibly required to receive delivery,
168. See Plaintiffs Exhibit A, Hedge To Arrive Contract between Schewe and
Top of Iowa, Top of Iowa (No. C 96-3146-MWB) (demonstrating that handwritten
entries essentially correspond to details of futures contracts). For a discussion of
how the terms of HTA contracts are generally established, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
169. See Plaintiffs Exhibit A, Hedge To Arrive Contract between Schewe and
Top of Iowa, Top of Iowa,.6 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (No. C 96-3146-MWB) (demonstrat-
ing that most handwritten entries are based on details of futures contracts).
170. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc.,
680 F.2d 573, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding standardized Agency Agreements
were futures contracts). In both cases, contract prices tracked the then-prevailing
market prices, delivery dates were relatively predetermined and the contract quan-
tities were multiples of standard units. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 847-48
(describing details of HTAs between Schewe and Top of Iowa); Co Petro, 680 F.2d
at 580-81 (describing details of Co Petro's Agency Agreements).
171. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (describing business in which broker
is engaged); Co Petro, 680 F.2d at 576 (describing Co Petro as "a broker of petro-
leum products").
172. For a comparison of the characteristics of the HTAs and Co Petro's
Agency Agreements, see supra note 170 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the roll of standardized contract terms in facilitating offset transactions, see
supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
173. See In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 312-15 (9th Cir. 1991) (deciding that,
although contracts were sufficiently standardized to constitute futures contracts,
exchange trading requirement did not apply because Bybee and supplier retained
right to enforce delivery obligation).
174. See id. (holding contracts that were sufficiently standardized to be futures
contracts nevertheless satisfied cash forward exclusion because of enforceable de-
livery obligation).
175. See In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,941, at 23,779 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979) (observing that only one customer ever
fulfilled delivery obligation and stating that "this lack of delivery is the clearest
indication that the contracts were not" cash forward contracts).
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few ever did.1 76 The parties eventually offset nearly every contract
through third party transactions. 177 By contrast, Schewe's HTAs were ca-
pable of offset, but neither party ever nullified the delivery obligations that
way. 178 As noted previously, Schewe himself indicated that he expected
and intended eventually to deliver the grain. 179 Thus, although it may be
possible to take issue with the court's assessment that the terms of the
HTAs were individually negotiated, the parties' course of performance
under the HTAs still supports the view that the contracts carried a bona
fide delivery obligation. 180
The court also did not examine whether rolling effectively eliminates
the delivery obligation, as rolling may not be truly permissive.1 81 The
court justified rolling as an acceptable practice on the grounds that it was
done as a matter of the elevator's permission, not as a contractual obliga-
tion.182 If, as Schewe asserted, permitting farmers to roll HTAs is the re-
176. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Noble Metals Int'l, Inc., 67
F.3d 766, 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing customers' requirements under con-
tracts for receipt and delivery of metals).
177. See id. at 769 ("Instead of taking physical delivery, however, the custom-
ers would contract for the third party to receive, and then sell, the metal.").
178. See Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847-49 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (describing parties' course of performance under HTAs in question). Even
though Top of Iowa permitted Schewe to roll the HTAs, rolling only defers the
delivery'date. See id. at 848 (same). For a discussion of the mechanics and effect of
rolling futures contracts months under HTAs, see supra notes 53-73 and accompa-
nying text.
179. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (discussing Schewe's intention to
make actual delivery). For a discussion of the significance of Schewe's statements,
see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of the evidence indicating the parties intended actual
physical transfer of the underlying grain, see supra notes 122-24, 138-41 and ac-
companying text.
181. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (holding that lack of express provi-
sion dealing with rolling indicated rolling was matter of elevator's discretion). The
same court previously addressed the issue of whether rolling eliminates the deliv-
ery obligation in Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1043-44 (N.D.
Iowa 1998). In Oeltjenbrun, the court viewed rolling as even less characteristic of
futures contracts than bookout agreements because rolling does not extinguish
the delivery obligation. See id. (comparing rolling transactions to bookout agree-
ments). In both cases, the courts assumed the elevators' ability to refuse to roll.
See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (asserting elevator's lack of contractual obliga-
tion to execute roll transactions); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (same). Signif-
icantly, the district court has acknowledged explicitly the inherent speculative side
of these transactions. See id. at 1044 (asserting rolling increases risk and allows
farmer to speculate on price of grain, but "does not negate the nature of these
contracts as contracts for actual physical delivery of grain").
182. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (determining that "the agreements
to roll Schewe's contracts were separate, individually negotiated, new agreements"
executed by Top of Iowa's permission, not as matters of obligation). Admittedly,
the HTAs made no mention that Top of Iowa was in any way obligated to roll
Schewe's contracts. See id. at 847-48 (describing HTAs between Schewe and Top of
Iowa). The parties' performance under the contracts, however, may indicate their
expectations better than the written terms of the contracts. See Noble Metals, 67
F.3d at 769, 772 (asserting parties' true expectation under contracts was evident in
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suit of elevators trying to capture greater market share, then market
pressures may make rolling a required feature of HTA contracts. 18 3 Grain
elevators that do not permit rolling would risk losing business to elevators
that do.184 If this is the case, it weakens the court's comparison to the
bookout agreements. 185 Courts permit bookout agreements in recogni-
tion of the reasonable need, in certain circumstances, to renegotiate or
even cancel the delivery terms of cash forward contracts. 186 When renego-
tiation, either through rolling or offsetting transactions, becomes the rule
rather than the exception, however, the inference grows that the parties
are engaged in price speculation rather than normal hedging.
18 7
pattern of failure to perform delivery obligations even though written terms of
contracts explicitly required delivery and prohibited offsetting). For a discussion
of the suspicion with which courts and other observers have examined the written
terms of similar contracts, see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
If Top of Iowa was actually bowing to market pressures in allowing Schewe to
roll and not simply making an exception for a customer in need, then rolling may
have been an unwritten but presumed feature of the contracts. For a further dis-
cussion of elevators' alleged business objectives and incentives in rolling farmers'
HTAs, see supra notes 148, 154-55 and accompanying text. To the extent that Top
of Iowa was economically (if not legally) obliged to roll Schewe's HTAs, such an
arrangement would still represent strong evidence that the HTAs were intended as
a means of speculating in the futures market. See Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 769, 772-
73 (determining that, despite contract terms explicitly requiring delivery and
prohibiting offsets, contracts were futures contracts based on parties' failure to
perform delivery obligations).
183. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 9, Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (No. C 96-3146-MWB)
(asserting speculative features of HTAs offered as "misguided attempt [by eleva-
tors] to outdo each other in a race to capture market share by any means
necessary").
184. See id. (implying market pressures make permitting rolling nearly obliga-
tory). For a discussion of the role of other HTA features as a possible advantage
elevators hold over commodity brokerages in competing for farmers' futures trad-
ing business, see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
185. See Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (predicating comparison to bookout
agreements on lack of contractual obligation in original written HTAs requiring
elevator to execute rolls); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (same).
186. See In re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that con-
tracts settled through bookout agreements, as opposed to delivery, were still within
cash forward exclusion); Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, supra note 96, at
47,023 (recognizing parties entering contracts with enforceable delivery obliga-
tions and contemplating delivery may be unable to determine at time of entering
contract whether delivery will be necessary); Statutory Interpretation, supra note
96, at 39,189-91 (asserting CFTC regulatory scheme should not apply to transac-
tions with enforceable delivery obligations in which "delivery is deferred for rea-
sons of commercial convenience or necessity").
187. See Noble Metals, 67 F.3d at 772-73 (relying on widespread disregard of
delivery obligations to determine contracts were futures contracts).
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1999] NOTE
V. IMPACT
In the final analysis, HTAs obviously do not fit neatly into either cate-
gory-futures or cash forward contracts. 18 8 In form and function they sat-
isfy the criteria of both cash forward and futures contracts. 189 They are far
more speculative than ordinary cash forward contracts, yet they generally
carry a meaningful delivery obligation. 190 The courts that have addressed
the issue have seized on this delivery obligation in holding that HTAs meet
the requirements of the cash forward exclusion.'91 Although some courts
have recognized the inherent speculative nature of HTAs, they have not
expressed concern for the impact of this characteristic.' 92
188. See lavarone, supra note 5, at 393-99 (discussing whether HTAs are cash
forward or futures contracts); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 125 (noting legality of
HTAs is difficult to determine due to significant variations); Cole, supra note 5, at
254-55 (discussing legality of HTAs).
189. SeeJohnson v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (N.D. Iowa
1998) (noting that like cash forward contracts, HTAs can be, and frequently have
been, used to transfer ownership of grain); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 (not-
ing farmers had previously delivered grain under HTAs). Like futures contracts,
however, HTAs can be used for purposes of speculating directly on regulated fu-
tures exchanges on price changes in the underlying commodity. See lavarone,
supra note 5, at 393-99 (discussing futures-like aspects of HTAs); Asklesen, supra
note 5, at 123-25 (describing HTAs and discussing elevators' competition with
commodity brokers); Cole, supra note 5, at 254-55 (noting some HTAs may be
found to be illegal off-exchange futures); see also CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra
note 53, at 43,851-52 (declining to determine status of HTA contracts with respect
to cash forward exclusion, but enumerating contract features consistent with "pru-
dent risk-reduction"). Some HTAs even carry buyout provisions that enable par-
ties to cancel the delivery obligation by making a cash payment. See Land O'Lakes,
18 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (stating farmers asserted, and elevator did not dispute, that
contracts included buyout provision).
190. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (holding HTAs in question were
contracts on which parties contemplated and intended actual delivery); Barz v.
Geneva Elevator Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 945, 954 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (same); Ander-
sons, Inc. v. Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d 931, 936 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (same); Top of Iowa,
6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (same); In re Grain
Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. 1267, 1277 (D. Minn. 1997) (same); Countrymark
Coop., Inc. v. Smith, No. 5-97-21, 1997 WL 762813, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8,
1997) (same).
191. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (holding HTAs in question were
valid cash forward contracts because parties contemplated and intended actual de-
livery); Barz, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (same); Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (same); Top
of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856, 858 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (same);
Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1277 (same); Countrymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *8
(same).
192. See Land O' Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (ruling farmer's asserted belief
that HTAs were intended for speculating did not alter nature of HTAs as contracts
for physical delivery of grain); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (asserting that
rolling does not negate nature of HTAs as contracts for physical delivery of grain,
despite raising risk and allowing producer to speculate); Grain Land Coop., 978 F.
Supp. at 1277 (asserting that rolling introduces imprudent risk, but does not de-
tract from contract's principal purpose as marketing tool).
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HTAs pose such analytical difficulties because they were intended to
be speculative instruments as well as a means of passing title. 19 3 They ex-
hibit aspects of cash forward and futures contracts because they were
designed to serve the underlying purposes of both instruments. 19 4 HTAs
carry delivery obligations because the parties generally do intend to pass
title to the grain. 19 5 HTAs also represent greater speculative opportuni-
ties because the parties intend that as well. 19 6 The economic reality is that
grain producers today are looking for newer, more flexible instruments
that they can use to sll their crops and still take advantage of other profit-
able opportunities that may arise.' 97 HTAs are a logical result of the need
for hybrid instruments that provide grain producers with means to man-
age risk while maximizing their opportunities in a volatile market. 198
The likely outlook for the foreseeable future is that the legal and eco-
nomic situations will remain unsettled.1 99 No cases have yet reached the
193. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (holding that HTAs in question
were contracts on which parties contemplated and intended actual delivery, even
though farmer asserted belief that purpose of HTAs was speculation); Barz, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 954 (holding HTAs were contracts for delivery of grain); Crotser, 7 F.
Supp. .2d at 936 (same); Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 1044 (same); Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1277 (same); Coun-
trymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *8 (same); see also lavarone, supra note 5, at 390 (em-
phasizing that HTA serves only as means of speculation).
194. See Asklesen, supra note 5, at 122 (asserting HTAs were created as mar-
keting tool); Cole, supra note 5, at 244 (stating farmers use HTAs as speculative
means of obtaining highest price possible for grain).
195. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (holding HTAs in question were
contracts on which parties contemplated and intended actual delivery); Barz, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 954 (same); Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (same); Top ofIowa, 6 F. Supp.
2d at 856 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (same); Grain Land Coop., 978
F. Supp. at 1277 (same); Countrymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *8 (same); see also As-
klesen, supra note 5, at 122 (asserting HTAs were created as marketing tool).
196. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (disregarding, but not contra-
dicting, farmers' asserted belief that purpose of HTAs was speculation); see also
lavarone, supra note 5, at 390 (emphasizing HTA serves only as means of specula-
tion); Cole, supra note 5, at 244 (stating farmers use HTAs as speculative means of
obtaining highest price possible for grain).
197. See David C. Barrett, Hedge-To-Arrive Contracts, 2 DRAKE J. AGRic. L. 153,
154 (1997) (asserting that political and economic developments create need for
flexible hybrid contracts); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 138-39 (observing commodity
price volatility will lead to development of other contracts similar to HTAs).
198. See Barrett, supra note 197, at 154 (discussing need for HTAs); Asklesen,
supra note 5, at 139 (implying that development of HTAs and similar contracts is,
in part, outgrowth of market volatility).
199. Compare Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (holding as matter of law
HTA was valid cash forward contract), with CFTC Interpretative Statement, supra note
53, at 43,851-52 (considering determination that certain HTAs are illegal). On the
one hand, all of the courts that have addressed the issue so far have held, as a
matter of law, that HTAs are valid cash forward contracts. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F.
Supp. 2d at 997 (holding HTAs in question were valid cash forward contracts be-
cause parties contemplated and intended actual delivery); Barz, 12 F. Supp. 2d at
954 (same); Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (same); Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 856,
858 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (same); Grain Land Coop., 978 F.
Supp. at 1277 (same); Countrymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *8 (same). On the other
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circuit court level, so no decisions have binding precedential value outside
of their immediate districts. Although most decisions that have reached
the merits have held that HTAs are valid cash forward contracts, only a few
such cases have been reported overall, and these cases have presented lit-
tle variation in terms of arguments and relevant facts.
200
Some argue that cash forward contracts and simple HTAs provide
farmers with sufficient downside price protection and that the only advan-
tage of newer HTAs is that they give the farmer greater speculative oppor-
tunities.20 1 As a result, courts should consider HTAs futures contracts
subject to the exchange-trading requirement of the CEA.2 0 2 Proponents
of regulation, however, are likely to meet with frustration as long as they
advocate application of the existing concepts. 203 Courts attempting to fit
HTAs into one category or the other will continue to determine that the
HTAs are cash forward contracts because the prevailing test is predicated
hand, the CFTC may be leaning toward a determination that HTAs with certain
features or administered in certain ways are illegal off-exchange futures contracts.
See CFFC Interpretative Statement, supra note 53, at 43,851-52 (discussing practices
consistent with prudent risk-reduction); see also Barrett, supra note 197, at 172-73
(discussing HTA features and practices likely to invalidate contracts).
In addition, grain markets are likely to face more volatility in the future. See
id. at 178 (implying that changes in government farm policy will lead to greater
volatility); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 126 (discussing market forces resulting in
price volatility in 1995-96). Furthermore, it would be unwise to ignore the possibil-
ity of a reoccurrence of the market factors blamed for the 1995-96 price rise, such
as changes in government farm policies, a large corn processing industry with a
relatively inelastic demand for corn, the growth of large hog production systems
with a relatively inelastic demand for corn and global policy changes. See id. (dis-
cussing market forces influencing volatility in corn market).
200. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 992, 997 (holding HTAs between
grain buyers and sellers were valid cash forward contracts, even though amount of
grain committed exceeded farmers' annual production and farmers asserted that
intent of contracts was to speculate); Barz, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 954, 957 (holding
HTAs between grain buyers and producers, even though rolled, were valid cash
forward contracts); Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (holding HTAs between grain ele-
vator and farmer that contained explicit roll provisions were valid cash forward
contracts); Top of Iowa, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (holding HTAs between grain buyers
and producers, even though rolled, were valid cash forward contracts); Oeltjenbrun,
3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (same); Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1277 (same);
Countrymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *8 (same).
201. See lavarone, supra note 5, at 390 (emphasizing HTA serves only as means
of speculation).
202. See id. at 397-99 (arguing certain HTA features and practices make them
illegal off-exchange futures contracts).
203. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97 (ruling that farmer's asserted
belief that HTAs were intended for speculating did not alter nature of HTAs as
contracts for physical delivery of grain); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (assert-
ing rolling does not negate nature of HTAs as contracts for physical delivery of
grain, despite giving rise to risk and allowing producer to speculate); Grain Land
Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1277 (asserting rolling introduces imprudent risk, but does
not detract from contract's principal purpose as marketing tool).
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on the intent to deliver.20 4 Intent to deliver will usually be discernible as
long as HTAs are designed, in part, to market grain. 20 5
The best strategy for those seeking to regulate HTAs is to advocate
reconsideration of the intent to deliver as a factor in distinguishing cash
forward contracts from futures contracts. 20 6 Their approach should be to
remind the courts that the intent underlying commodities regulation was
to curb excess speculation and price manipulation and also to argue that
speculative instruments such as HTAs are not necessary given the availabil-
ity of less-speculative instruments that adequately accomplish valid market-
ing objectives. 20 7
The main problem with this proposed strategy is that it will require
courts and legislatures to discard the traditional belief that it is possible to
separate the everyday transactions incident to activities in the commodities
markets from speculative activities typical of the futures markets. 20 8 This
strategy will also require those bodies to take the additional step of decid-
ing that the need to regulate speculation is greater than the desire to pro-
tect commodity producers from regulation. 20 9
In addition, regulating HTAs may be a somewhat heavy-handed re-
sponse, considering that the parties usually are in the business of produc-
ing, selling and buying grain.2 10  Presumably, they have some
204. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97 (holding HTAs were contracts
for physical delivery of grain despite farmers' asserted belief that contracts were for
speculating); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (ruling that HTAs were valid cash
forward contracts because parties contemplated and intended actual delivery, de-
spite speculative nature of rolling); Grain Land Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1277 (same).
205. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (holding HTAs in question were
contracts on which parties contemplated and intended actual delivery); Baz, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 954, 95 (same); Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (same); Top of Iowa, 6 F.
Supp. 2d at 856 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (same); Grain Land
Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1277 (same); Countrymark, 1997 WL 762813, at *8 (same); see
also Asklesen, supra note 5, at 122 (asserting that HTAs were created as marketing
tool).
206. For a discussion of the significance of the delivery obligation in deter-
mining the validity of deferred shipment contracts, see supra note 40 and accompa-
nying text.
207. For a further discussion of the objectives of commodity futures markets
regulation, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
208. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc.,
680 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing creation of cash forward exclusion as
attempt to exempt "legitimate commercial transactions" from regulation aimed at
curbing speculative abuses in futures trading).
209. See Futures Trading Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutri-
tion and Forestry, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1996) (statement of Sen. Richard G.
Lugar) (discussing dilemma of balancing need for maintaining public confidence
in well-regulated marketplace and need to free marketplace from regulation for
competitive purposes).
210. See Land O'Lakes, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (observing contracts were be-
tween parties engaged in business of producing, selling and buying grain); Ban, 12
F. Supp. 2d at 945-46 (same); Crotser, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (same); Top of Iowa, 6 F.
Supp. 2d at 847 (same); Oeltjenbrun, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (same); Brown v. North
Cent. F.S., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (same); Grain Land
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understanding of the usual dynamics of their markets as well as the risks
involved in speculative hedging.2 11 Investor education may be more in
keeping with the recent trend of reducing the level of government involve-
ment in the agricultural economy.2 12 As government involvement gives
way to market forces, farmers will need the increased flexibility that instru-
ments such as HTAs offer.2 13 Farming is increasingly becoming more of a
business than an occupation. 21 4 Those engaged in the business will best
be able to succeed if they are allowed access to the tools they need and the
training to use those tools properly.2 15
Charles F. Reid
Coop., 978 F. Supp. at 1269 (same); Gunderson v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 976 F.
Supp. 818, 820 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (same); Herwig v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, No. 96 C
6107, 1997 WL 72079, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 1997) (same); Eby v. Producers Co-
op, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 428, 430 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (same); Farmers Co-operative
Elevator v. Abels, 950 F. Supp. 931, 932 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Hodge Bros. v.
DeLong Co., 942 F. Supp. 412, 414 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (same); Countymark, 1997
WL 762813, at *8 (same); see also Barrett, supra note 197, at 177-78 (arguing gov-
ernmental regulations restrain agriculture); Asklesen, supra note 5, at 122 (stating
that regulation results in competitive disadvantages in form of increased costs and
reduced flexibility of marketing instruments).
211. See Barrett, supra note 197, at 177-78 (asserting grain producers are be-
coming increasingly sophisticated in business matters).
212. See id. (arguing that changes in government farm policy create need for
wide variety of flexible marketing and risk-management tools and education to
maximize their benefits).
213. See id. (emphasizing need for more flexibility and wide variety of market-
ing and risk-management tools in wake of changes in farm policy).
214. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1997 665-66, 668 (1997) (indicating following agri-
cultural trends between 1982 and 1992: 14% decrease in total number of farms;
4% decrease in total amount of land in farms; and 10% increase in average size of
farms; and following trends between 1987 and 1992: 8% decrease in number of
family-owned farms and 9% increase in number of corporate-owned farms).
215. See Barrett, supra note 197, at 177-78 (arguing that grain producers need
greater choice of more flexible financial tools as well as training to use those
tools).
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